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Although language is a tool for communication, most research in the neuroscience of
language has focused on studying words and sentences, while little is known about the
brain mechanisms of speech acts, or communicative functions, for which words and
sentences are used as tools. Here the neural processing of two types of speech acts,
Naming and Requesting, was addressed using the time-resolved event-related potential
(ERP) technique. The brain responses for Naming and Request diverged as early as
∼120ms after the onset of the critical words, at the same time as, or even before, the
earliest brain manifestations of semantic word properties could be detected. Request-
evoked potentials were generally larger in amplitude than those for Naming. The use of
identical words in closely matched settings for both speech acts rules out explanation of
the difference in terms of phonological, lexical, semantic properties, or word expectancy.
The cortical sources underlying the ERP enhancement for Requests were found in the
fronto-central cortex, consistent with the activation of action knowledge, as well as in
the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), possibly reflecting additional implications of
speech acts for social interaction and theory of mind. These results provide the first
evidence for surprisingly early access to pragmatic and social interactive knowledge, which
possibly occurs in parallel with other types of linguistic processing, and thus supports the
near-simultaneous access to different subtypes of psycholinguistic information.
Keywords: speech act, pragmatics, communicative action, social interaction, electroencephalography (EEG),
L1 norm source reconstruction, fronto-central cortex, temporo-parietal cortex
INTRODUCTION
Research in the neuroscience of language has so far mainly
focused on the brain basis of words and utterances. However,
the main function of language is to allow communication and
there is not a one-to-one relationship between utterances and
their function in communicative interactions. The same words
or utterances can be tools for different communicative functions.
For example, the sentence “Here is an apple” can be used to teach
somebody the meaning of the word, to direct somebody’s atten-
tion to a particular object, or to offer it upon request. Clearly, it
is the situation and context, that is, pragmatic information that
determines these communicative functions and the way the utter-
ance is typically understood. It remains largely unknown how
this communicative function is represented in the human brain
and when its processing takes place in language comprehension.
This study aims to take a first step in exploring the brain basis of
communicative functions, or the so-called speech acts, for which
linguistic utterances serve. Importantly, it attempts to establish
the neural time course of comprehension of communicative func-
tions, and situates pragmatic processing in relation to other types
of psycholinguistic information access. To this end, an experi-
ment was conducted, comparing the brain responses in subjects
watching video clips with Naming or Request interactions, in
which the same single word utterances were used to perform
these speech acts. The neurophysiological responses are used to
draw conclusions about the time course and cortical loci of brain
processes supporting speech act understanding.
SPEECH ACT PROCESSING
A speech act (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; Van Dijk, 1977; Fritz
and Hundsnurscher, 1994; Horn and Ward, 2006; Ehlich, 2010)
can be characterized by specifying (1) the linguistic utterance used
to perform it; (2) the physical setting in which the communica-
tive actors find themselves; (3) the intentions and assumptions the
actors commit themselves to; and (4) the action sequence struc-
tures in which the speech act is typically embedded (i.e., actions
occurring with the speech act, including those preceding and
following it). As there are many different speech acts, (for a sys-
tematic classification see Bach and Harnish, 1979; Searle, 1979),
we here focus on two prototypical examples, the speech acts of
Naming and Requesting (Figure 1).
In a communicative situation involving two people (a Speaker
and a Partner), the use of the word “Water” by the Speaker while
pointing at a glass of water on a table can be understood by the
Partner as NAMING the liquid in the glass. However, the same
word utterance in the same context can alternatively be under-
stood as a REQUEST to give the glass of water to the Speaker.
In this situation, the linguistic utterance (1) and the physical set-
ting (2) will be identical for the two speech acts, because the same
single word is used, and the same physical object is available.
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FIGURE 1 | Comparison of pragmatic properties of the speech acts of Naming (Top) and Requesting (Bottom). Action sequence schemes (Left) show
typical actions following the speech acts, which are closely linked to the intentions and assumptions (Right) characterizing the speech acts.
However, other aspects of the context, including the assumptions
and intentions of both communicating partners, as well as the
structure of the expected action sequences, differ between the two
speech acts.
In the situation of Naming, the Speaker produces a linguis-
tic utterance appropriate for referring to the object in question.
The assumptions associated with the utterance include (but are
not limited to) the Speaker knowing the name of the object and
willingness to communicate it to the Partner, pronouncing it cor-
rectly, referring to an appropriate object, and so on. Accordingly,
potential Partner’s actions can possibly involve Clarifying the
name, Correcting, or Confirming it verbally (i.e., suggesting a
different name or agreeing with the Speaker) or non-verbally
(a negative shrug or a positive nod).
On the other hand, in the situation of Requesting, the Speaker
typically indicates an object that she or he wants to obtain from
the Partner. The assumptions behind the speech act of Requesting
include those typical of Naming, such as the correct use of the
word and clear articulation from the Speaker. In addition, there
are assumptions specific to a Request, for instance the Speaker’s
intention to get the object. Crucially, the assumptions characteris-
tic of a Request include additional ones about the Partner, namely,
the Partner’s ability to perform the required action (here—to
hand over the requested object), as well as his/her willingness to
do so. With a growing number of assumptions associated with a
Request, there is also a wider range of actions potentially follow-
ing the speech act of Request. Similarly to Naming, the Partner
can respond to a Request by asking for a clarification of the lin-
guistic utterance if the latter is not well-formed, by correcting
the use of the word, or by complaining about the absence of the
requested object. Additionally to the responses typically following
Naming, the Partner can choose to perform the required action,
i.e., pass the object over to the Speaker; or refuse to perform the
required action, if the assumption that they are able or allowed to
do so is not satisfied; or they can choose to deny it, in case they are
fully capable of performing the action but are not willing to do
so. The assumptions and intentions characterizing Naming and
Request actions are illustrated, along with the associated struc-
tures of action sequences, in Figure 1. Note that both speech acts
are social and can be followed by actions, however, compared
with Naming, Requests involve more action (e.g., that an object
needs to be manipulated) and social interaction knowledge (e.g.,
recognizing the Speaker’s desire to obtain the object).
These premises allow generating theoretical predictions also
for the neurophysiology of speech act processing. First, Requests
may activate brain areas for processing of action and social-
interaction knowledge more than Naming. These areas are in
the fronto-central sensorimotor system (Pulvermüller and Fadiga,
2010) and in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) (Van Overwalle
and Baetens, 2009), respectively. Stronger activation during
Naming compared with Request might, in turn, be expected in
areas important for linking linguistic representations with visual
objects representations. Such semantic areas that might be of spe-
cial importance for processing the referential link between words
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and objects are in the middle temporal cortex and other parts
of the temporal lobe (Damasio et al., 1996; Pulvermüller and
Fadiga, 2010). Finally, left perisylvian and visual word form area
activations may be expected during both Naming and Request,
as written language stimuli are used in this study. These pre-
dictions were experimentally tested here by contrasting Naming
and Request action performed with the same words, embed-
ded in similar physical settings but with different communicative
functions.
TIMECOURSE OF SPEECH ACT PROCESSING
This study also addresses the issue of the time course of psycholin-
guistic information access. Based on the relative time course
of semantic and pragmatic information access, it is possible to
compare serial or cascaded models of processing (postulating
sequential access to phonological, lexical, semantic, syntactic, and
pragmatic information each taking about 100ms to complete; see
e.g., Garrett, 1980; Friederici, 2002; Pickering and Garrod, 2004)
and near-simultaneous processing models (assuming parallelism
in the processing of different types of linguistic information, tak-
ing place within 200ms from the stimulus onset, and followed by
the second stage of semantic and syntactic reanalysis and second-
order cognitive processing between 200 and 600ms Marslen-
Wilson, 1975; Marslen-Wilson and Tyler, 1980; Pulvermüller,
1996; Pulvermüller et al., 2009; Shtyrov, 2010). To identify relative
time course of single-word semantic and pragmatic process-
ing, critical words (concrete nouns) of two semantic categories
(“Hand-related” and “Non-Hand-related”) were used as stim-
uli. The Hand type comprised the words denoting functionally
manipulable objects (e.g., “spoon,” manual action is necessary
to use the object) and Non-Hand type included words denoting
objects that do not require manual actions (e.g., “plant,” although
manual action is possible, it is not necessary), as used in previous
work (Rueschemeyer et al., 2010); thus, semantic and pragmatic
factors were orthogonally manipulated.
Serial/cascaded models predict that semantic processes start
before pragmatic processes, and thus a sequence/cascade of phys-
iological effects, with no (or only minimal) interactions between
the processing stages, is expected. In this experiment, a serial-
onset model would predict differences between semantic cate-
gories identified first, likely around 200ms, and the differences
between the speech act types first present later, after 400ms.
According to the model of near-simultaneous processing of psy-
cholinguistic information (Pulvermüller et al., 2009), the process
of integrating speech act information should take place in par-
allel with lexical-semantic information access. This view predicts
that both the semantic and the pragmatic manipulations will be
reflected in neural activation before or around 200ms, likely with
an interaction between semantic and pragmatic levels. The differ-
ences will persist at a later time window of about 400ms, at least




Twenty healthy right-handed volunteers took part in the study.
Two participants were excluded from further analysis: one
because of left-handed first-order relatives, and the other based
on poor performance on the behavioral task (low accuracy and
fast reaction times). Additionally, the behavioral data from one
participant were not collected due to software failure. Thus, the
final sample consisted of 18 participants (12 females, mean age=
26, range 18–40, SD = 6.8), with 17 of them contributing to the
reported behavioral measure. The participants were all mono-
lingual native speakers of British English. Informed consent was
obtained from the participants, and they were paid for taking
part in the experiment. All were right-handed, according to the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), mean lat-
erality coefficient of 80.5 (range 53–100, SD = 16.8), without
left-handed first-order relatives. A measure of general intelligence
was obtained, using the Cattell Culture Fair Test, Scale 2 Form
A [Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, 1973 (Cattell,
1971)]; the group’s mean Cattell score was 36 (range 27–42, SD =
4.5). Ethical approval was obtained from the Cambridge Local
Research Ethics Committee.
STIMULI
The stimuli consisted of two sets of 16 experimental videos dis-
playing one trial sequence (see Figure 2). Each video featured
two persons (a “Partner” and a “Speaker”) sitting by a table in
front of each other and 12 objects lying on the table. Each video
started with the context sentence pronounced by the Partner deter-
mining the speech act for which the critical word pronounced by
the Speaker was used. Then, 10 trials followed, each including
the utterance of a critical word and a non-verbal action follow-
ing it. The 10 words were names of 10 out of the 12 objects on
the table. As determined by the context sentence, the utterance
of the critical word was either a Naming or a Request speech act.
The average duration of videos was 93 s (range 76–114, SD = 12).
Three male and three female speakers were used to record the
videos. Two of them were “Partners,” and four were “Speakers”
(gender-balanced). The positions of the Partner and Speaker in
relation to one another (left-right) were counterbalanced. The
videos were processed using Adobe Premier Pro software (Adobe
Systems Incorporated, San Jose, California, USA). The two sets
of experimental videos containing the same critical words and
objects, but differing in the speech act type, were presented in two
lists counterbalanced between groups. The details on the content
of the videos and the stimuli selection are described below.
Three pairs of matched sentences (three providing the context
for the speech act of Naming, e.g., “Which of these things can
you name?” and three for the speech act of Request, e.g., “Which
of these things would you like?”) were used. These six sentences
were pseudo-randomly used in 16 trials. The sentences in each
pair were matched on the number of words and complexity. They
represented different syntactic types (interrogative, imperative).
One hundred and sixty monosyllabic words (from noun
categories: food, tools, animals, clothes, everyday objects) and
corresponding objects were selected from two semantic types,
Hand-related and Non-Hand-related. A rating study based on
7-point Lickert scale was run with 10 native English speakers as
participants to empirically assess semantic properties of the stim-
ulus words: imageability, concreteness, arousal, valence, potency,
association with action, manipulability, and visual movement
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(i.e., the movement that can be perceived visually, such as that
of a flying bird). The ratings confirmed the a priori classifica-
tion of stimulus words as either strongly Hand-related or Non-
Hand-related and the absence of differences along other semantic
properties. The two groups were also matched on the number of
letters, word form and lemma frequency (linear and logarithmic),
the number of orthographic neighbors (words that can be derived
from a given word by exchanging one letter), and orthographic
bigram and trigram letter frequency using CELEX (Baayen et al.,
1993). All words were either lexically unambiguous nouns or,
in case of lexical ambiguity, predominantly used as nouns (for
details, see Table 1).
In addition to the 160 objects denoted by the matched words,
32 objects were added as fillers used for the experimental task.
This was done to exclude the possibility that the participants
could infer with absolute certainty, which objects would be
FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of trials in the Naming (Top) and
Request (Bottom) conditions. A trial sequence starts with a display of
objects and communicating actors. A context sentence (e.g., “What can
I get you?”) is uttered by the Partner. Following this, a series of 10
loops are presented, in which the Speaker’s face appears together with
the critical word-utterance (naming vs. requesting an object), followed
by an action (handing over or pointing at the object), involving different
words and objects. The trial sequence finishes with a task to press a
button (yes-no) if the test word shown on the screen has appeared in
the trial.
Table 1 | Psycholinguistic and semantic properties of Hand-related and Non-Hand-related word stimuli.
A. NL WF Log WF LF Log LF OBF OTF ONS
Mean—Hand (SE) 4.22 (0.09) 25.91 (4.27) 1.17 (0.05) 55.43 (8.75) 1.51 (0.05) 36255.38 (1982.75) 3486.57 (266.15) 8.55 (0.66)
Mean—Non-Hand (SE) 4.18 (0.09) 25.93 (4.45) 1.14 (0.05) 60.84 (8.90) 1.51 (0.05) 35968.12 (1984.95) 3721.68 (281.42) 8.60 (0.68)
p-value (t-test, 2-tailed) 0.71 ns 1.00 ns 0.77 ns 0.67 ns 0.96 ns 0.92 ns 0.54 ns 0.96 ns
B. NM Noun Verb Other WF (as Noun) WF (as Verb) LF (as Noun) LF (as Verb)
Mean—Hand (SE) 0.28 (0.05) 1 (0) 0.71 (0.05) 0.04 (0.02) 24.39 (5.03) 0.98 (0.40) 50.52 (13.03) 25.88 (11.7)
Mean—Non-Hand (SE) 0.35 (0.07) 1 (0) 0.68 (0.05) 0.05 (0.03) 26.40 (4.68) 1.05 (0.38) 56.56 (10.36) 6 (9.02)
p-value (t-test, 2-tailed) 0.51 ns 1.00 ns 0.69 ns 0.77 ns 0.77 ns 0.89 ns 0.71 ns 0.99 ns
C. Action Hand Movement Imageability Concreteness Arousal Valence Potency
Mean—Hand (SE) 4.45 (0.10) 4.55 (0.13) 4.44 (0.12) 6.47 (0.05) 6.64 (0.04) 2.75 (0.11) 4.27 (0.08) 3.92 (0.09)
Mean—Non-Hand (SE) 3.33 (0.12) 2.86 (0.15) 3.72 (0.11) 6.42 (0.05) 6.68 (0.05) 2.82 (0.11) 4.38 (0.07) 3.93 (0.09)
p-value (t-test, 2-tailed) <0.001 *** <0.001 *** <0.001 *** 0.53 ns 0.54 ns 0.68 ns 0.33 ns 0.97 ns
Mean values, Standard Error of Mean and significance p-values are shown. (A) Psycholinguistic properties. NL, Number of letters; WF, Word form frequency; Log WF,
Logarithm to base 10 of WF; LF, Lemma frequency; Log LF, Logarithm to base 10 of LF; OBF, Orthographic bi-gram frequency; OTF, Orthographic tri-gram frequency;
ONS, Orthographic neighborhood size. (B) Use as members of lexical classes. NM, Number of meanings; Noun, Proportion of use as a noun; Verb, Proportion of
use as a verb; Other, Proportion of use as other parts of speech; WF (as Noun), Word form frequency as a Noun; WF (as Verb), Word form frequency as a Verb; LF
(as Noun), Lemma frequency as a Noun; LF (as Verb), Lemma frequency as a Verb. (C) Semantic ratings (7-point Lickert Scale). Action, Action-relatedness; Hand,
Hand-relatedness; Movement, Visual movement-relatedness; Imageability; Concreteness; Arousal; Valence; Potency.
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named/requested by the end of each multi-item trial. All the
objects were divided into 16 sets of 12 objects (10 relevant critical
words and 2 fillers), so that in each set there were objects of both
semantic types as well as fillers, and that the objects varied in size
within and across sets.
After the utterance of the critical word in 80% of the cases, the
typical action followed, i.e., handing over of the requested object
in the Request condition and pointing to the named object in
the Naming condition. In 20% of the cases, either a verbal clar-
ification (“What did you say?” or “Could you repeat it please?”
uttered by the Partner) or a gestural refusal (negative headshak-
ing/shrug by the Partner) occurred. These additional actions were
introduced to closely approximate the context in which Naming
and Request typically occur, as well as to ensure that the particu-
lar speech act can only be determined with certainty at the critical
word and not before it.
PROCEDURE
The stimuli were visually presented using E-prime 2.0
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The partici-
pants were asked to attend to the experimental stimulation using
visually presented instructions, and, to ensure their attention on
the stimulation, were warned that they would be tested on its
content. The participants were told that they would see videos
of two people interacting, and that one of them would ask the
other to name the objects on the table, or to ask for these objects,
and that the speakers can only answer “in one word.” Single
word use allowed avoiding the use of articles, which could differ
between stimuli and could introduce additional variability in the
event-related potential (ERP) signal.
After the instructions, 16 trials, each followed by a task, were
presented as described in Figure 2. The video with a spoken con-
text sentence was shown, but the critical words were presented
visually against the background of the Speaker’s face (on the
lips) for 150ms followed by a video of an action of pointing to
or handing over the object named or requested using the criti-
cal word. Each context sentence was followed by 10 word-action
pairs.
Finally, to test the participants’ attention on the visual input,
they were asked to press the button “yes” or “no” (left/right, coun-
terbalanced between subjects) to indicate whether the test word
presented after the video in the middle of the screen for 2000ms
had been mentioned in the video. Accuracy and reaction times
were recorded.
EEG RECORDING
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was measured in an elec-
trically and acoustically shielded EEG chamber at the MRC
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit in Cambridge, UK. Data
were recorded from 128Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted on the EEG
cap (actiCAP, Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). The elec-
trodes were arranged according to the extended 10/20 system.
Data were sampled at 500Hz with a band-pass filter 0.1–100Hz.
FCz was used as recording reference for the EEG channels.
The EOG was recorded bipolarly through electrodes placed
above and below the left eye (vertical) and at the outer canthi
(horizontal).
DATA ANALYSIS
The acquired EEG data were processed offline using Brain Vision
Analyzer 1.05 (Brain Products) software. They were bandpass-
filtered at 1–40Hz with a notch filter of 50Hz, segmented into
epochs starting 100ms before the onset of the word to 800ms
thereafter, with the baseline corrected using−100 to 0ms interval
before the stimulus onset. Epochs with signal exceeding −75 and
75µV were discarded and data were re-referenced to the average
mastoids. The time windows for the analysis were defined using
the top quarter of amplitude of the peaks observed in the global
field power (GFP) waveform calculated on the selection of elec-
trodes (see below) and showing activation collapsed over all four
conditions averaged across all participants. Following this, three
types of analysis were used.
Firstly, the statistical analysis was performed on the GFP mean
amplitudes to determine any global effects of the pragmatic and
semantic conditions. An ANOVA with Pragmatics (two levels:
Naming and Request) × Semantics (two levels: Non-Hand cat-
egory and Hand category) was performed for each time window
separately.
The second step of the statistical analysis was performed
using response amplitudes in a selection of electrodes in order
to evaluate the topography of the activations. For the statis-
tical analysis in signal space a selection of 32 electrodes (see
Figure 3), where activity was strongest, was made. The elec-
trodes were divided into anterior (F7, F5, F3, F1, F2, F4, F6, F8;
FT7, FC5, FC3, FC1, FC2, FC4, FC6, FT8) and posterior (TP7,
CP5, CP3, CP1, CP2, CP4, CP6, TP8; P7, P5, P3, P1, P2, P4,
P6, P8). These were further divided into left-hemispheric (odd
electrode numbers) and right-hemispheric (even electrode num-
bers), and within each hemisphere they were divided into more
peripheral (lines 7,5,6,8) vs. more central (lines 3,1,2,4). This elec-
trode selection allowed contrasting a number of topographical
factors—anteriority (anterior-posterior), laterality (left-right), as
well as centrality (central-peripheral). Separate ANOVAs with
the factors Pragmatics (2) × Semantics (2) × Anteriority (2) ×
Laterality (2) × Centrality (2) were performed for each of the
time windows. A Huynh-Feldt correction was applied whenever
there was more than one degree of freedom in the numerator.
For all interactions a separate analysis investigating the contri-
bution of the Semantic and Pragmatic factors at all the levels of
the interaction was performed. Significant results of the pairwise
comparisons for the pragmatic and semantic conditions, mean
values and standard errors are reported.
Additional statistical tests for possible effects in N400 and
P600 time ranges often implicated in language ERP studies
(350–450ms and 550–650ms, respectively) were also performed
using procedures identical to the above.
Finally, in order to localize cortical sources of the activa-
tions underlying differences between the main conditions (see
“Results”), L1 Norm current estimation on ERP difference
between the Request and Naming conditions, as well as the
Hand and Non-Hand conditions, was performed (using CURRY
6.1 software, Compumedics Neuroscan, Hamburg, Germany).
This distributed source analysis method produces only a few
active sources per latency and is very sensitive to signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR). The solutions were calculated for grand-averaged
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 86 | 5
Egorova et al. Speech act neurophysiology
FIGURE 3 | Selection of time windows and electrodes for the
topographical analysis. Global field power (GFP) calculated on the
selection of 32 electrodes showing activation collapsed over all four
conditions averaged across all participants, and illustration of time
windows and electrodes included in further topographical signal-space
analysis: green—peripheral, purple—central.
responses, as this has improved SNR compared to individual
source solutions (especially important for EEG source localiza-
tion, which is more prone to error), and were focused on those
latencies where significant effects were found in the statistical
analysis above. A three-layer boundary element model (BEM)
with triangularized gray matter surface of a standardized brain
(Montreal Neurological Institute) was used for computing the
source reconstruction solutions. The solutions were restricted to
cortex surface. Noise covariance matrix was applied and noise
user defined interval was set from −100 to 0ms. For each of
the sources, the putative regions they correspond to and, where
available, the Brodmann areas, are reported.
In addition to the ERP analysis triggered by and following
the critical words, a separate analysis of the neurophysiological
response to the fixation cross preceding the critical word was
performed. This was done to check whether there were any neuro-
physiological differences between Naming and Requests contexts
that were independent of the linguistic processes brought about
by the critical, speech act carrying linguistic structure. Please
recall that, within the time interval preceding each critical word,
a fixation cross was presented against the Speaker’s face (sim-
ilarly to the critical words) for the duration of 1000ms. The
analysed epochs starting 100ms before the onset of the cross
to 1000ms thereafter were processed in the same way as the




Accuracy in the behavioral task was high (Naming: mean 85.3%,
SE = 3.5; Request: 89.8%, SE = 2.6) and did not differ signifi-
cantly between the pragmatic conditions [t(16) = 1.165, p > 0.05,
2-tailed]. There were also no significant differences in reaction
times (Naming: 1561ms, SE = 131; Request = 1504ms, SE =




The GFP waveform showing activation collapsed over all four
conditions across all the selected electrodes revealed peaks at 128,
180, 310, and 468ms (see Figure 3). Time windows were defined
around these peaks approximating the top quarter in amplitude
of each peak, resulting in the intervals 110–130ms, 175–185ms,
260–335ms, 445–540ms.
The GFP analysis of Pragmatics × Semantics effects for sep-
arate time windows showed the following (see Figures 4A,B).
In the time window 110–130ms, a significant main effect of
Pragmatics [Request > Naming, F(1, 17) = 5.382, p = 0.03], and
a near-significant effect of Semantics [Hand > Non-Hand,
F(1, 17) = 4.265, p = 0.054], emerged. In the second time win-
dow of 175–185ms, there was a significant effect of Semantics
[Hand > Non-Hand, F(1, 17) = 4.400, p = 0.05]. The analysis of
the third time window of 260–335ms did not show any signifi-
cant results; and in the fourth window of 445–540ms there was
only a near-significant effect of Pragmatics, F(1, 17) = 0.081, with
more positivity observed for Request than for Naming. Additional
time windows of the GFP were tested but the statistical analysis
did not confirm any significant differences outside the four peaks,
including the typical N400 and P600 time ranges.
Analysis of brain activity preceding the critical word (at the
presentation of a fixation cross) revealed a similar GFP curve
as seen to critical words, with peaks at 80–100ms; 140–160ms;
210–250ms, corresponding to typical visual ERP latencies of N1,
P1, N2 components. A repeated measures ANOVA (Semantics ×
Pragmatics) was performed for each of the three time windows,
as for the word-elicited responses. No significant interactions
or main effects of either semantic or pragmatic conditions were
found in response to the simple cross.
Topographical analysis
The results of the ANOVAs performed for the four time windows
individually are reported below. The topographical maps of the
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FIGURE 4 | Continued
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FIGURE 4 | Summary of main results. (A) Pragmatic conditions grand
average GFP time-locked to the noun onset (blue—naming, red—request);
vertical and horizontal EOG grand average curves (no significant differences
between the conditions in the analysed time windows); bar graphs illustrating
the significant results of the GFP analysis for the pragmatic contrast; the results
of L1-norm source reconstruction (Request >Naming). (B) Semantic
conditions grand average GFP time-locked to the noun onset (gray—Non-Hand,
black—Hand); vertical and horizontal EOG grand average curves (no significant
differences between the conditions in the analysed time windows); bar graphs
illustrating the significant results of the GFP analysis for the semantic
contrast; the results of L1-norm source reconstruction (Hand>Non-Hand).
(C) Topographical plots for each time window and condition. (D) Bar graphs
illustrating the significant results of the topographical analysis for each time
window, the error bars represent Standard Error of the Mean, the asterisks
indicate significant differences between the conditions in pairwise
comparisons, at p < 0.05.
activations for each of the time windows for each condition are
shown in Figure 4C and the main statistical findings per time
window are illustrated in Figure 4D.
Time window 1 (110–130ms). A four-way interaction of
Pragmatics, Semantics, Anteriority, and Centrality was observed
[F(1, 17) = 6.725, p = 0.02]. Pairwise comparisons confirmed
that the basis of this interaction was the difference between the
pragmatic conditions at the anterior central electrodes in the
Non-Hand category (Naming −1.848 ± SE 0.517µV; Request
−2.147 ± 0.493µV; p = 0.02) and at the anterior peripheral
electrodes in the Hand category (Naming −2.580 ± 0.364µV;
Request −2.906 ± 0.558µV; p = 0.04).
Time window 2 (175–185ms). Similarly to the first time
window, there was a four-way interaction of Pragmatics,
Semantics, Anteriority, and Centrality [F(1, 17) = 14.935, p =
0.001]. Pairwise comparisons showed that there were significant
differences between the pragmatic conditions (Naming 1.313 ±
0.551µV; Request −0.145 ± 0.860µV; p = 0.05) at the anterior
peripheral electrodes in the Hand semantic category. This is the
only time window and electrode selection where Naming elicited
larger ERP amplitudes than Request.
Time window 3 (260–335ms). A significant interaction of the
factors Pragmatics and Laterality was observed [F(1, 17) = 6.414,
p = 0.02], with a greater negativity in response to Request com-
pared to Naming in the left hemisphere (Naming −1.426 ±
0.552µV; Request −2.227 ± 0.515µV; p = 0.04) but not in the
right.
Time window 4 (445–540ms). A near-significant interaction of
the factors Pragmatics and Anteriority was observed [F(1, 17) =
4.202, p = 0.056]. The pairwise comparisons suggested that it
was due to a trend toward higher positive amplitude in the
Request condition than in the Naming condition at the ante-
rior sites (Naming 6.117 ± 1.524µV; Request 7.409 ± 1.666µV;
p = 0.07) but not at the posterior ones. Further pairwise com-
parisons showed that there were significant differences between
the pragmatic conditions (higher amplitude for Request) at the
anterior left sites (Naming 6.005 ± 1.500µV; Request 7.612 ±
1.625µV; p = 0.05), and they were most pronounced at the ante-
rior left central sites (Naming 6.107 ± 1.545µV; Request 8.104 ±
1.770µV; p = 0.04).
SOURCE RECONSTRUCTION
Reconstruction of the sources of activation was performed sep-
arately for pragmatic and semantic contrasts (see Figures 4A,B,
respectively).
For the pragmatic conditions, the difference between Request
and Naming was calculated and then used for the reconstruction
of cortical sources contributing to the higher Request activation.
The sources for the opposite contrast were not calculated, as in
the GFP analysis there was no main effect of Pragmatics, with
activation in the Naming condition larger than in the Request
condition. The sources are reported for the four peaks identified
in the GFP analysis (see Figure 3)
Peak 1 (128ms): Sources of increased activation to Request
compared to Naming were observed in fronto-central areas,
including superior, medial, and inferior frontal gyri (BA45
and 47) bilaterally, as well as in the postcentral gyrus in the
left hemisphere. The difference was also observed in temporo-
parietal areas, including the inferior temporal gyrus, superior,
and inferior parietal lobule bilaterally, as well as the TPJ in the
right hemisphere.
Peak 2 (180ms): The differences were largest in the frontal
(superior, medial, and inferior frontal gyri) and temporal areas
(BA21) bilaterally, as well as in the parietal (both inferior and
superior) areas in the right hemisphere.
Peak 3 (310ms): Bilateral sources were identified in the frontal
(superior, medial, and inferior gyri) and inferior parietal areas
bilaterally, and in the post-central and temporal areas in the
right hemisphere.
Peak 4 (468ms): The last peak revealed sources in the frontal
areas, especially the inferior frontal gyrus, as well as precen-
tral and postcentral areas in the left hemisphere and superior
temporal areas around the TPJ in the right hemisphere.
For the semantic condition, the GFP and the signal space
analyses showed Semantics main effects and interactions (Hand
> Non-Hand) only in the first two time windows (120 and
180ms); therefore, sources were reconstructed on the difference
wave (Non-Hand condition subtracted from Hand condition)
only for these time windows.
Peak 128ms: Sources in the fronto-central areas including left
inferior frontal gyrus and right temporal pole were identi-
fied. The superior frontal and left precentral gyrus (BA4) were
activated.
Peak 180ms: Robust bilateral sources in the precentral gyrus
were revealed, together with the activation in the bilateral
inferior and middle frontal areas and mostly left-temporal
sources.
DISCUSSION
Event-related brain potentials demonstrated an early and robust
neurophysiological dissociation between speech acts performed
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with identical single words in closely matched physical settings.
When words were used to Request an object, activation was
near-instantaneously (latency 110–130ms) enhanced in inferior-
frontal language areas and in bilateral fronto-central sensorimo-
tor systems, compared with a condition where the same words
were used to Name objects.
Request-elicited activation was also enhanced in the right
TPJ. Pragmatic effects occurred at approximately the same
time as those related to semantic differences between crit-
ical word stimuli, with a range of statistical interactions
between these two types of variables throughout the response
epoch.
TIME COURSE OF SPEECH ACT AND LEXICO-SEMANTIC PROCESSING
Both statistical analysis of GFP and signal space topographi-
cal analysis of ERPs consistently revealed significant effects of
pragmatics early on. Although these different analysis tech-
niques led to somewhat divergent results, they are open to a
coherent interpretation. A significant main effect of Pragmatics
emerged in the first time window analysed (110–130ms) and
was accompanied by a near-significant (p = 0.054) main effect
of Semantics, which became fully significant in the second (175–
185ms) time window, thus suggesting near-simultaneous prag-
matic and semantic processing at these very early latencies.
That both psycholinguistic factors, Pragmatics, and Semantics,
were neurophysiologically reflected at early latencies was further
confirmed by signal space analysis, but, in this case, by signif-
icant interaction effects of Semantics and Pragmatics in both
early time windows now also involving topographical variables.
This latter result provides evidence in favor of not just simul-
taneous but also interactive processing of semantic and prag-
matic information. In particular, the interaction effects speak
against a serial time line of semantic and pragmatic processes.
Together, the results of GFP analysis and topographical analy-
sis of ERPs indicate a predominance of pragmatic effects early
on and of semantic effects slightly later, but demonstrate that,
on a finer analysis level, both factors are manifested neuro-
physiologically together at both of the early time windows
analysed.
At 200ms after the critical word stimulus (speech act onset)
and later, no significant main effects were observed in the GFP
analysis for either Semantics or Pragmatics factors, including
no significant modulation of N400 and P600 components. In
the signal space analysis involving topographical factors, both
factors, Semantics and Pragmatics, interacted with each other
in the first two time windows, leaving, however, a significant
Pragmatics-by-Laterality interaction in the 3rd time window
(up to 335ms) and only a marginally significant interaction of
Pragmatics with the Anteriority factor in the 4th time window,
thus suggesting that by 200ms all relevant semantic informa-
tion was processed, and that after 350ms the pragmatic effects
were no longer fully significant. In the context of previous find-
ings suggesting the N400 as the main neurophysiological marker
in both semantic (see Lau et al., 2008) and pragmatic domains
(see Van Berkum, 2009 for a review), as well as a P600 sig-
naling both syntactic and pragmatic effects (see Van Berkum
et al., 1999; Burkhardt, 2007; Coulson and Lovett, 2010) these
findings are somewhat unexpected. Note that, in previous stud-
ies, late (>350ms latency) results were elicited by a variety
of different extralinguistic experimental manipulations, rang-
ing from matching the speaker voice with the message (Van
Berkum et al., 2008) and responding to morally objectionable
statements (Van Berkum et al., 2009) to discourse and world
knowledge integration (Hagoort et al., 2004). It may, therefore,
be that in some of the earlier studies the brain responses were
dominated by rather late, task-induced “second thought”-type of
processes. The present study is the first to examine the dynam-
ics of basic speech act comprehension, emphasizing everyday
conventional interaction, without relying on unexpected stim-
uli and comparing different pragmatic conditions to each other
rather than to violation conditions. It may be that these features
are critical for obtaining the early neurophysiological manifesta-
tions of pragmatic processes documented here. There are several
ways in which the current experiment is different from previous
research.
Firstly, most pragmatic N400 effects reported in the litera-
ture have been elicited in violation conditions, when unexpected
words were used in a wider sentential, discourse, or world knowl-
edge context. As it is not clear how far violation paradigms reflect
normal language processing, in the current experiment all of
the speech acts appeared in an expected context with congru-
ent actions preceding and following the utterance (hence the
lower integration processing costs). Moreover, mutual confound-
ing of semantic and pragmatic factors was avoided by including
Semantics as a separate orthogonal factor in the experimental
design with well-matched stimulus categories and conditions.
Previous findings show that when all the psycholinguistic and
semantic properties of the stimuli are controlled, brain signa-
tures of semantic understanding and contextual integration are
present before 200ms (Pulvermüller, 2001; Sereno et al., 2003;
Barber and Kutas, 2007; Penolazzi et al., 2007; Wirth et al., 2008;
Hauk et al., 2009; Pulvermüller et al., 2009). Besides, some of
the effects labeled as N400 for the wider discourse integration
start early at 150ms (Van Berkum et al., 2003) so that it needs
to be investigated whether such early effects are best described
as parts of the N400 or as separate early responses. The early
onset is in line with the early effects reported here, although
the early effects seen here were clearly different from N400-like
responses.
Secondly, all previous studies used syntactically complex stim-
uli; therefore, the heavy processing load imposed by the need
for analysing and possibly re-analysing complex syntax may have
delayed pragmatic effects artificially. Pragmatic P600 effects are
often reported in this case, for example in experiments on inte-
gration of bridging inferences in sentences, or in a comparison
of indirect requests and literal statements, using 7-word utter-
ances (e.g., Burkhardt, 2006, 2007; Coulson and Lovett, 2010).
In the current experiment single words were used leaving only
contextual/pragmatic differences to explain the divergence of the
ERP waves and avoiding any potential delay necessitated by pro-
cessing of different types of information. Single word utterances
are a standard way of communication. They are simple, and yet
fully natural. Note that the choice of single word utterances (or
“holophrases”) as stimuli is well-motivated and firmly rooted
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in the pragmatic literature (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1953; Dore, 1975;
Barrett, 1982).
In the current experiment, 10 critical words were introduced
by one context sentence, which could have influenced the speed
of processing, by increasing statistical probability of the speech
act type within a trial, thus making it more predictable. Such pre-
sentation, however, is common in real life communication. For
example, in a restaurant it is natural to order several items follow-
ing the waiter’s question “What can I get you?” In such everyday
language contexts, it would be rather unnatural to request only
one item at a time expecting a new question for the next one.
Therefore, the temporal dynamics revealed with this mode of
stimulus presentation is relevant for everyday social communica-
tive interaction. That said, we acknowledge that the exact timing
of speech act processing in unpredictable contexts with controlled
low probabilities within trial sequences may well be different and
should thus be addressed in future experiments.
Importantly for the current results, even though the context
was already set before the critical words appeared, no differ-
ences between Naming and Request were present prior to the
critical words. The analysis of the brain activation during the
presentation of simple stimuli (fixation crosses), which were pre-
sented after the sentences but before the critical words, did not
reveal any significant differences between the pragmatic condi-
tions. Therefore, it was only the presentation of word stimuli, with
which typical Naming or Request actions can be performed that
triggered significant pragmatic processing differences. This is not
surprising given the design of the experiment, which makes the
speech act of interest likely, but not certain. Although the context
sentence appeared in the beginning of the trial, this context did
not ultimately determine the speech act type of the utterance, for
which the subsequent word was used. By using the context sen-
tences, the speech acts of Offering assistance (e.g., “What can I get
you?”) and Asking for a label (e.g., “What are these called?”) were
performed. The action sequence structure for the Offer allows for
different moves, including Requests for an object (such were most
of the stimuli in our experiment), Rejection of the offer (e.g.,
by uttering “Nothing”), or Clarification (e.g., by saying “What
did you say?”). These other (i.e., neither Naming nor Request)
response types were implemented in least 20% of the trials. In
other words, in the situation when the context sentence “What
can I get you?” in our experiment was followed by “Nothing,” this
latter word could not be interpreted with certainty to function
either as a case of Naming or as a Request. Therefore, the context
sentence was not sufficient to determine the Speech act type at the
point when the critical word appeared, and thus, the disambigua-
tion point was at the onset of the critical word, which was used
to perform either a Naming or a Request action. Clearly, in the
absence of the critical word, no Naming or Requesting could be
performed.
In summary, these results support the model of near-
simultaneous processing of subtypes of psycholinguistic informa-
tion (Marslen-Wilson, 1975; Pulvermüller et al., 2009; Shtyrov,
2010), which predicts that all the relevant information about all
the levels of language processing (phonological, lexical and mor-
phological, semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic) is first accessed
within the first 200ms of the critical stimulus onset. All the
processing is done in a parallel rather than consecutive fashion,
and leads to interaction between the various processing levels,
which was shown here for the levels of semantics and pragmatics.
The re-computation and post-processing in the later time win-
dows is not necessary but can happen, giving rise to task-related
post-understanding (e.g., decision about semantic-conceptual
correctness, voice identity, etc.) and other second thought type
of processing, if a more complex stimulus is encountered. In
the current experiment, both semantic and pragmatic effects
were registered within the first 200ms, exhibiting interactions
between semantic and pragmatic levels in the first two time win-
dows, with most effects remaining only marginally significant by
400–500ms, given that simple, predictable, psycholinguistically
controlled single word stimuli were used.
These results do contradict two premises of serial and cas-
caded psycholinguistic models. Firstly, the observed interactions
between semantics and pragmatics in early time windows chal-
lenge the prediction that the processing is consecutive and sup-
ported by separate processing components. Secondly, the effects
of pragmatics starting concurrently with, or even before seman-
tics, contradict the idea of successive processing, when a higher
(pragmatic) level is not reached until the lower (semantic) level
information is processed.
Note that, in view of the recent discussion of possible temporal
imprecision—in the range of 20–30ms—introduced by low-
pass filtering of EEG data and associated filter ringing artifacts
(VanRullen, 2011; Widmann and Schröger, 2012), no filter ring-
ing artifacts were detected in the current analysis. Importantly, the
general conclusions that (1) pragmatic effects appear extremely
early and (2) early semantic effects documented in previous lit-
erature could be replicated in this study, remain unaffected, even
if the exact timing of the peaks may be subject to modification
(±20–30ms) in future studies.
It is also important to point out that the current result is
obtained for the comprehension of speech acts by an external
observer. Although it is likely that a similar pattern of activity may
take place in individuals who participate in the interaction per se
(i.e., Speaker and Partner), future studies are necessary to inves-
tigate the production and comprehension of speech acts from the
perspective of the immediate agents involved.
BRAIN LOCI OF SPEECH ACT PROCESSING
With respect to the neural bases of speech act comprehension,
throughout all investigated time windows, starting from 110ms,
the speech act of Requesting elicited generally higher ERP ampli-
tudes. L1minimumnorm estimation of cortical sources suggested
that two specific regions of cortex—bilateral fronto-central and
right temporo-parietal areas—showed enhanced activation dur-
ing processing Requests compared with Naming.
Together the signal space analysis with the topographical fac-
tors and the reconstruction of sources of activation indicated
the involvement of the bilateral IFG and sensorimotor areas
(pre-/post-central gyri) in all the time windows. The activation
in these regions is best explained by the action-related nature of
a Request. Since Requests are embedded in an action sequence
structure (Fritz and Hundsnurscher, 1994), which is more com-
plex in the case of a Request than in Naming (see “Introduction”
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and Figure 1), the fronto-central cortex could be the neural basis
supporting the knowledge about and implementation of these
action-sequences. Sequence processing and computation of hier-
archical action structure is likely to be carried out by Broca’s area
and premotor cortex (in interaction with other areas and func-
tions; see, e.g., Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010) in a way similar to
the storage of action-semantics.
Another observation from the source reconstruction was the
engagement of areas around the right posterior superior temporal
sulcus (pSTS), inferior parietal sulcus (IPS), and TPJ. These areas
are often implicated in social inferencing (IPS) and the recogni-
tion of communicative traits (rTPJ) and intentions (pSTS) (Sassa
et al., 2007; Van Overwalle et al., 2009; Noordzij et al., 2010). As
to the activation in this region, Fogassi et al. (2005) have previ-
ously suggested that inferior parietal areas play a role in intention
recognition through the involvement of mirror neurons that dis-
criminate identical motor acts according to the action goal they
achieve. This mechanism could be relevant for speech act com-
prehension in that speech acts are embedded in larger action
sequences with different communicative goals. Similarly to the
encoding of motor acts by predicting the goal of the action in
the experiments of Fogassi and colleagues, speech acts in this
study could be differentiated by predicting the actions they are
followed by. Noordzij and colleagues have specifically attributed
the recognition of the intent of the communicative actions, both
in the communicator and the comprehender, to the right poste-
rior STS (Noordzij et al., 2010). Moreover, the temporal dynamics
of the activation in this temporo-parietal region in the current
experiment, namely its early start, resembles that revealed by
Van Overwalle and colleagues in an EEG experiment showing
that trait inferencing in goal-directed behavior engages the right
TPJ, starting at 150ms (Van Overwalle et al., 2009). However,
bearing in mind that the spatial resolution of the EEG source
reconstruction only allows coarse localization, these activation
patterns and their implications for speech act processing should
be taken as indicative and investigated with spatially more pre-
cise metabolic imaging techniques (fMRI) and higher-density
neurophysiological recordings (combined EEG/MEG) in future
studies.
Only in one time window did the topographical analysis reveal
greater activation to Naming than to Request. In the 2nd time
window centered around 180ms, pragmatic effects were revealed
specifically at the anterior-peripheral sites in the “Hand-related”
semantic category. The spatially specific dominance of Naming in
this time window might suggest that the speech act of Naming
activated the mechanism of retrieval of the semantic information
about the named objects in temporal regions. However, this find-
ing was not supported by the GFP results for the two pragmatic
factors, and in the absence of confirmatory sources of activa-
tion, any conclusions about naming-specific activation remain
suggestive.
Thus, comprehension of speech acts activates cortical areas
that support crucial components of the communicative func-
tion they bear. In the case of Naming, the main function is to
refer to an object by using a linguistic expression, which activates
semantic knowledge linking the two. For this process, temporal
areas, interfacing between visual and language areas seem most
relevant. This study provided limited evidence for such activa-
tion. However, in the case of Request, the main function is to
make the Partner perform an action, which requires the knowl-
edge of social actions the speech act may bring about as part of its
action sequence structure (Figure 1), and such pragmatic link-
age to action knowledge was reflected at the level of the brain
by activation in the inferior frontal and sensorimotor cortices.
Additionally, given that the action of Requesting presupposes that
the Speaker predicts and recognizes the goals and intentions of
these social actions (e.g., differentiating between denying and
refusing the request) of the Partner, the engagement of the right
temporo-parietal cortex known to be relevant for interaction
and social knowledge was observed. All of these activations were
recorded while the participants simply observed and understood
social communicative interaction.
The finding that speech act processing engages the sensori-
motor system and the inferior parietal cortex, possibly reflecting
pragmatically related access to action knowledge, and intentions
and assumptions, respectively, resembles a previous report by Van
Ackeren and colleagues (2012) who found that the same brain sys-
tems were active for processing indirect requests (critical condi-
tion) but not literal statements (control condition). Based on this
fMRI study alone, it is, however, not clear whether sensorimotor
and inferior-parietal activations appear at early or late laten-
cies. Unlike the EEG technique applied here, the nature of fMRI
makes it impossible to draw conclusions about the time course
of cognitive processes with millisecond precision. Such fMRI
results are therefore open to an interpretation of results in terms
of post-understanding epiphenomenal activations. Furthermore,
the comparison of indirect requests with statements also leaves
it open to what degree the differential brain activations reflected
speech act processing per se or rather the indirectness of such acts.
Van Ackeren and colleagues interpret the effects in their study in
terms of indirectness; however, the speech act types of the stim-
uli, requests vs. statements, were also different. The present results
show clearly that sensorimotor and inferior-parietal activations
occur early, which provides an argument that they are related
to comprehension processes. Crucially, sensorimotor and inferior
parietal activations here represent a signature of the speech act of
Requesting, independent of directness or indirectness. This novel
finding suggests that the above interpretation in terms of indirect-
ness needs to be revised in favor of speech act types as the critical
factor. However, both studies taken together now converge on the
finding that during Request processing, sensorimotor and theory-
of-mind (TOM) areas are engaged, which possibly reflects access
to action knowledge and social-interaction information relevant
in the comprehension process.
CONCLUSIONS
Speech acts of Naming and Request performed by uttering a
single word were compared in an EEG experiment. Activation
differences were found as early as ∼100–200ms after the onset
of the word, with which the critical speech acts were performed,
when, as suggested by the significant interaction in the topo-
graphical analysis of the first time window, processing of both
pragmatic and semantic aspects of meaning began. These find-
ings are not compatible with the predictions of serial processing
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models but provide strong evidence for near-simultaneous access
to psycholinguistic information in the mind and brain in speech
act comprehension.
Further analysis of the response amplitude and topogra-
phy in the signal space and the activation sources suggested
that the neural organization of speech act processing involves
the left perisylvian cortex (for linguistic processing), bilateral
fronto-central cortex (for processing action sequence structures),
and right temporo-parietal cortex (for processing further inter-
action knowledge and aspects of theory of mind). These brain
areas appear to particularly contribute to specific types of speech
acts; namely Requests, were found to activate sensorimotor
cortex and right temporo-parietal regions more strongly than
Naming.
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